Climb down or pragmatism? : Recent developments in Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policy, 2009 to 2016
by Musiwaro Ndakaripa
(International Studies Group, University of the Free State, South Africa)
5 December 2016.
Economic indigenisation has been a recurring theme in post-colonial Zimbabwe. In the early 2000s the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government tended to conflate indigenisation with the land question for electoral purposes. However, as the land question lost its lustre in the late 2000s indigenisation stood as a distinct subject shaping the political landscape in the country. A critical examination of recent developments on the indigenisation policy suggest that ZANU-PF piggybacked the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) parties during the power sharing government (PG) era by enforcing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007 despite its negative effects on foreign investment and the economy in general. ZANU-PF’s game plan was to gain popularity through the policy but share the blame with other political parties in the government if the economy was to nosedive. Once ZANU-PF retained power and faced the unenviable task of sustaining and growing the economy the party climbed down on indigenisation. This is apparent in public pronouncements by senior government officials and the lukewarm implementation of the policy.
The power sharing era
Arguably the indigenisation debate reached fever pitch during the PG era, 2009 to July 2013. During this period the ZANU-PF side of the PG, which was in full control of the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, used controversial regulations and public notices to enforce the Indigenisation Act. The Act requires all non-indigenous companies to dispose 51% shareholding to indigenous people. ZANU-PF’s indigenisation drive was supported by existing indigenous interest groups such as the Indigenous Business Development Centre, Affirmative Action Group, Indigenous Business Women Organisation and Zimbabwe Indigenous Economic Empowerment Organisation. During the PG era new indigenous interest groups emerged and these included the Zimbabwe Economic Empowerment Council, Pan-African Development Foundation, Upfumi Kuvadiki (literally: Wealth to the Youth), Zimbabwe Youth Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Young Zimbabweans Business Platform and Marange Youth Empowerment Trust. Unlike the 1990s and early 2000s during the PG era existing and emerging indigenous interest groups questioned ZANU-PF’s claim that the programme was broad-based. They shifted their rhetorical attacks from white and foreign owned business entities to pressuring the government to ensure that indigenisation should be broad-based.
The Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), the Movement for Democratic Change led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M), the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and business associations such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), the Chamber of Mines, the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe and the Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe were leading critics of indigenisation. However, in comparative terms and paradoxically, it was the RBZ Governor Gideon Gono, a ZANU-PF loyalist, who was, by far the strongest critic of the indigenisation drive. Gono emphasised that it was his duty as a technocrat to advise politicians on indigenisation. Gono opposed what he saw as the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach adopted by the Indigenisation Ministry in implementing the indigenisation programme.
One commendable aspect of Gono’s contribution to the debate over the enforcement of the Indigenisation Act was offering an alternative. Gono proposed what he called Public Private Sector Indigenisation Partnership (PPIP) derived from the concept of Public Private Sector Partnership (PPP). He averred that PPIP was better than the government’s indigenisation model because it simultaneously prioritises empowerment; and business synergies and expansion. Gono’s proposed PPIP involved outsourcing, mentorships, alliances and franchising. He stressed that this model was better than the one in the Indigenisation Act which emphasised distribution of shareholding, dividends and profits in existing companies. Moreover, Gono emphasised that PPIP would ensure even distribution of wealth to women, youths and marginalised groups rather than confining the benefits of the programme to well-connected elites. The above evidence revealed that Gono did not only criticise the indigenisation policy but also offered alternatives, a key tenet of constructive criticism. This gained Gono the respect of the business community and the private print media which publicised his views.
Although the MDC-T challenged ZANU-PF’s indigenisation mantra the party was in a dilemma. The MDC-T partly opposed indigenisation in order to create rapport with the business community and foreign countries keen to invest in the country. However, the party feared that opposing the whole programme would appear being ‘pro-capital and anti-people’. The party feared this would backfire in the impending elections. ZANU-PF took advantage of MDC-T’s ambiguity on indigenisation to create internal divisions and present the party as ideologically bankrupt. The ZANU-PF controlled state media closely followed senior MDC-T officials’ pronouncements on indigenisation and made them public to expose inconsistency. The state controlled media presented MDC-T as divided on indigenisation. Indigenisation Minister Saviour Kasukuwere was on record emphasising that Prime Minister Tsvangirai, MDC-T ministers and parliamentarians supported indigenisation in government meetings while castigating the same policy at rallies and interviews with local private and foreign media. This smear campaign by ZANU-PF made it difficult for the MDC-T to develop a clear and more articulate message to challenge ZANU-PF’s indigenisation mantra.
Nevertheless, MDC-T attempted to counter ZANU-PF’s indigenisation programme by offering an alternative ‘empowerment model’. In October 2011, MDC-T formulated a programme known as Jobs, Investment and Upliftment Programme (JIUP). MDC-T wanted this programme to be implemented by the inclusive Government and its proposed policy prioritised expansion of businesses and creation of jobs. Ownership of business was expected to increase gradually with expansion of the economy. Tsvangirai’s argued that the implementation of JIUP would include all political parties to promote broad-based indigenisation. The JIUP policy document was later modified as Jobs, Upliftment, Investment Capital and the Environment (JUICE). This became the centre piece of MDC-T’s 2013 election manifesto. On 18 May 2013 the party launched a policy blueprint, Agenda for Real Transformation (ART), which it intended to adopt if it won the impending elections and formed a new government. In its policy blueprint the MDC-T pledged to create a ‘democratic developmental state’ and limit the role of the government in the economy. Other key points in ART were an economy guided by free-market enterprise principles, liberalisation of the labour sector, granting employers leverage in hiring and firing workers, and privatisation of state controlled enterprises such as Cold Storage Commission and Air Zimbabwe. Through the above mentioned policy alternatives the MDC-T attempted to counter ZANU-PF’s indigenisation message.
However, it seems that MDC-T’s ambiguous stance on indigenisation and its alternative programmes impressed neither the business community nor the labour movement. As early as 2009 some sections of the business community saw it as strategic to approach ZANU-PF moderates such as Vice-President Joice Mujuru and Gono to convince the government to shelve its plans to enforce the Indigenisation Act. During the PG era the private print media reported cases where the business community showed more confidence in Mujuru than in Tsvangirai. In April 2011, the Chamber of Mines appealed to Mujuru to intervene and influence the government to slow down the enforcement of the Indigenisation Act and indigenisation regulations. The private media reported cases where Mujuru rather than Tsvangirai was becoming more of a patron of the business community. For example Mujuru was the guest of honour at a one day international business conference organised by the National Economic Consultative Forum and the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair on 4 May 2011. These developments were seen by analysts as a vote of no confidence in Tsvangirai and the MDC-T. For Mujuru, her growing clout among local and foreign investors rattled ZANU-PF hardliners, including Mugabe. The ‘moderate’ tag was among a litany of allegations used against Mujuru and led to her sacking from the government and ZANU-PF in late 2014 and early 2015 respectively.
During the PG era ZCTU became suspicious of MDC-T’s socio-economic policies. In general, MDC-T failed to convince ZCTU that it represented workers’ interests and there was a growing wedge between the two. It was ART which exposed rifts between the MDC-T and ZCTU. ZCTU secretary general Japhet Moyo criticised ART as pro-capital and anti-workers. On 6 July The Sunday Mail interviewed ZCTU president, George Nkiwane, at a workshop in Gweru. Nkiwane threw his weight behind the indigenisation programme. Just like Moyo, Nkiwane opposed MDC-T’s ART policy document. Nkiwane lamented that ART prioritised the interests of employers who it intended to give leeway to hire and fire workers willy-nilly. He argued that MDC-T’s policy document did not protect workers. Nkiwane reportedly stated that workers would benefit from indigenisation and castigated opposition to the policy as short-sighted. Expressing frustration with the MDC-T, Nkiwane stated that ZCTU would not naively support any political party in the forthcoming elections but would support those with the interests of people at heart. The above evidence must not be misconstrued to mean that the business community and the labour movement were supporting ZANU-PF. Rather, it reveals MDC-T’s failure to develop an alternative economic policy which resonated, inspired and reinvigorated electoral support from the broader social spectrum.
The post-power sharing era
ZANU-PF used indigenisation as the central message in its manifesto in the run up to the harmonised elections held on 31 July 2013. The party ‘won’ the elections and formed a new government despite the disapproval of the MDC-T and other pro-democracy social movements. The ZANU-PF government softened its stance on indigenisation and even showed signs of readiness to review the policy. In his inauguration speech on 22 August 2013 Mugabe stated that the government would not insist on 51% shareholding in sectors not involved in the extraction of natural resources. Mugabe symbolically signalled to local and foreign investors that the government would be flexible on the indigenisation policy by replacing the combative Saviour Kasukuwere with the more moderate and soft-spoken Francis Nhema as the new Indigenisation Minister.
The ZANU-PF government took advantage of the United Nations World Tourism Organisation General Assembly which it co-hosted with the Zambian government in Livingstone and Victoria Falls from 24 to 29 August 2013 as an international platform to assure investors that the country was a safe investment destination. The conference was attended by over 1000 delegates from all over the world. In a 59 page pamphlet entitled Invest in Zimbabwe 2013 the government stated that its indigenisation policy was not akin to nationalisation. The document emphasised that the major objective of the policy was to integrate indigenous Zimbabweans in the mainstream economy. The ZANU-PF government also toned down on indigenisation in its economic blue print running from October 2013 to December 2018, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET). Although indigenisation is one of the key policies articulated there is neither insistence on 51% shareholding for indigenous people nor threats against foreign companies which violate the Indigenisation Act.
Amid this subtle climb down the indigenisation policy stagnated. The ZANU-PF Committee on Indigenisation told the delegates at the party’s Annual National People’s Conference held in Chinhoyi from 13 to 15 December 2013 that more than 19 foreign companies were refusing to comply with indigenisation laws. Some of the companies singled out were: Metallon Gold; Duration Gold Zimbabwe; Murowa Diamonds; Tongaat Hulett; Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe; ZIMASCO, Zimbabwe Granite International; Noral Private Limited, Barrow Properties; KW Blasting Specialists; Astiz Private Limited; Lady Anna Custom Milling; Kenilwold Investments; Cable Cast Enterprises; Plate Glass Company Zimbabwe Limited; Pioneer Hybrid Zimbabwe; Stramit Centre Africa; Illford Services and Pannar Seed. ZANU-PF’s Indigenisation Committee claimed that the Indigenisation Act’s provisions on compliance were weak and needed to be tough to enforce the policy. In March 2014 The Financial Gazette reported that seven diamond mining companies in Marange refuted that they had pledged to contribute to the US$10 million needed to fund the Zimunya Marange Community Share Ownership Trust established by the government. This means ordinary people in the Zimunya Marange area might not receive proceeds from diamonds mined in their area as stipulated in the indigenisation laws. The ZANU-PF government adopted a pragmatic approach. It has been unenthusiastic in strictly apply the Indigenisation Act because it needs more foreign investment in the country to save the economy.
While the above can be regarded as stagnation of the indigenisation policy there are cases of reversal. Since July 2013 some shares in both indigenous and foreign owned companies were acquired by foreign investors rather than by indigenous people. For example, in late September 2013 a Mauritian-based AfrAsia Bank Limited acquired more that 50% in Kingdom Financial Holdings owned by an indigenous entrepreneur, Nigel Chanakira. In February 2014 a Togo-based Ecobank International acquired 70% of shares in Premier Bank without any involvement of indigenous people. By March 2014 it became apparent that the ZANU-PF government was not fulfilling promises it made in the run-up to the 2013 harmonised elections. This exposes the disjuncture between ZANU-PF’s indigenisation rhetoric and policy practice.
The post-power sharing era witnessed implicit and explicit criticism of indigenisation from within ZANU-PF itself. In October 2013 the then ZANU-PF Hurungwe West Member of Parliament and the Zimbabwe Economic Empowerment Council (ZEEC) president, Temba Mliswa, told fellow legislators in the House of Assembly that the government’s indigenisation policy marginalised ordinary people and needed to be revised. Mliswa’s pronouncements were commended by civil society organisations. On 25 October 2013 ZCTU issued a press statement praising Mliswa for urging the government to revise the indigenisation policy. ZCTU applauded Mliswa’s pronouncements as echoing its long-standing contention that indigenisation ‘is merely a wealth grabbing exercise by a few elite individuals’. Mliswa’s statements exposed internal divisions within ZANU-PF on the indigenisation policy. This partly reflects that some ZANU-PF officials wanted the government to be more pragmatic by reviewing the indigenisation Act and grow the economy.
In the post-power sharing era, CZI has been consistently but cautiously advising the government to reconsider the Indigenisation Act. In October 2013 former CZI president, Joseph Kanyekanye, lamented that the manufacturing sector was underperforming and urged the government to revise the Indigenisation Act. CZI’s 2013 Manufacturing Sector Survey indicated that due to the indigenisation rhetoric towards the July 2013 elections investor confidence waned and the performance of the manufacturing sector declined. By April 2014 it became apparent that economic growth stagnated. On 30 April 2014 CZI president, Charles Msipa, told The Financial Gazette that most European Union investors regard Zimbabwe as unsafe to invest because of policy inconsistency, economic mismanagement, corruption and expropriation of private assets disguised as indigenisation. Msipa lamented that because of these factors European Union investors snub Zimbabwe and divert their capital to other countries in the region. Thus, CZI remained critical of the indigenisation policy in the post PG era.
The government heeded CZI’s advice on indigenisation. In late May 2014 the Cabinet met and agreed that the Indigenisation Act need to be reviewed. The Cabinet acknowledged that the Indigenisation Act’s requirement that indigenous people have 51% shareholding in natural and non-natural resources sectors of the economy was a flawed ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. The Cabinet realised that the Indigenisation Act was too stringent on sectors of the economy not involved in the extraction and use of natural resources. To this end, the Cabinet distinguished the natural resources and the non-natural resources sectors. The government maintained that indigenous people are the ultimate owners of country’s natural resources: land, minerals and wildlife (tourism). It therefore insisted that indigenous people must have at least 51% shares in sectors involving the use or extraction of natural resources. The Cabinet agreed that for sectors not involved in the use or extraction of natural resources the 51% indigenisation threshold can be reviewed downwards. The government’s new policy position was that foreign investors not involved in the use or extraction of natural resources must be allowed to recover their investment and operational costs before indigenous entrepreneurs can acquire shares. This was a clear sign that the government wanted to make its indigenisation law less stringent.
On 28 May 2014 Chinamasa told the House of Assembly that the Cabinet directed Indigenisation Minister Nhema to examine the Indigenisation Act with a view to aligning it to the new policy positions. Surprisingly, Indigenisation Minister Francis Nhema contradicted Chinamasa by announcing that the government does not intend to review the indigenisation law. This exposed the discord between the Finance and the Indigenisation ministries although they were all under a sole ZANU-PF government. This is a microcosm of broader disharmony between these ministries. The above discord was condemned by business associations. ZNCC chastised the government for failing to articulate its indigenisation policy with one channel and one voice. ZNCC argued that multiple government voices on the policy were creating uncertainty among the business community. ZNCC’s pronouncements revealed the business community’s displeasure with the lack of policy coherence within the government.
Fissures between the Finance and Indigenisation ministries continued to widened in 2014. This worsened the incoherence and inconsistency of the indigenisation policy. The Indigenisation Ministry accused the Finance Ministry of underfunding the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund, a statutory fund established by the government and managed by the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board to assist indigenous people and entities to acquire shares from foreign owned companies. For example in his 2014 National Budget statement Finance Minister Chinamasa allocated US$2,2 million to the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund instead of the US$10 million requested by the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board. To make matters worse, in July 2014 Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa declined to introduce an indigenisation tax to facilitate the transfer of shares from foreign owned companies to indigenous people as recommended by the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board. These differences put the Finance and Indigenisation Ministries at opposite sides of the indigenisation pendulum.
Nhema, Mujuru and several other ministers were fired from government in December 2014 for allegedly scheming to remove Mugabe from power unconstitutionally. Nhema was replaced as Indigenisation Minister by another moderate ZANU-PF politician Christopher Mushowe. In August 2015 Mushowe was redeployed to the Ministry of Information and was replaced by Mugabe’s nephew Patrick Zhuwao. Zhuwao’s attempt to adopt a radical indigenisation approach heightened tensions between the Indigenisation and Finance ministries. In his 2016 budget statement Finance Minister Chinamasa stated that only companies in sectors of the economy involved in the use or extraction of natural resources such as mining would be required to dispose of 51% shareholding to indigenous people. The budget statement stated that indigenisation policy must not be an obstacle to foreign investment. Indigenisation Minister Zhuwao protested that Chinamasa was making concessions to foreign companies and undermining the mandate of his ministry. The above evidence exposed the fact that the Finance and Indigenisation Ministries were at loggerheads on the indigenisation policy.
Chinamasa and Zhuwao’s differences on indigenisation went public in late December 2015. On 24 December 2015 Chinamasa and Zhuwao met in an attempt to narrow differences on the policy and planned to issue a joint press statement afterwards. However, they could not reconcile their divergent views. Chinamasa reportedly stormed out of the meeting in protest. On that same day Chinamasa went on to address a press conference on indigenisation in the absence of Zhuwao. Chinamasa stated that mining companies were required to dispose of 51% shareholding to indigenous people because they were extracting finite natural resources. However, Chinamasa stated that companies not involved in the extraction of resources such as those in the manufacturing and finance sectors could sell 20% or 30% of their shares to indigenous people in the short term. In addition, he announced that companies not involved in the extraction of natural resources could go for five years before meeting the 51% indigenisation threshold. On 25 December 2015, Zhuwao issued a press statement challenging some points in Chinamasa’s statement. Zhuwao opposed Chinamasa’s pronouncement that foreign companies not involved in the extraction of natural resources could take longer to meet the 51% indigenisation threshold. The public brawl between Chinamasa and Zhuwao exposed flagrant discord on indigenisation within the ZANU-PF government reminiscent of conflicts on the policy during the PG era.
In apparent damage control, in January 2016 Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko persuaded Zhuwao and Chinamasa to meet and iron out their differences on indigenisation and issue a joint press statement. On 4 January 2016 Zhuwao, Chinamasa and RBZ Governor John Mangundya issued a joint press statement outlining procedures and guidelines for implementing the Indigenisation Act. The statement which was read buy Zhuwao gave 31 March 2016 as the deadline for all foreign owned companies to submit their indigenisation plans. However, the statement toned down on indigenisation and vindicated Chinamasa as it was largely similar to his 24 December 2015 statement. Zhuwao stated that companies could liaise with the ministries they fell under to get details on sectoral indigenisation. Zhuwao stated that the government made the indigenisation Act less stringent in two ways. First, companies could offer an indigenisation threshold below 51% in the short term. Second, companies not ready to indigenise in the short term could pay an empowerment levy and actively participate in corporate social responsibility. This was probably Zhuwao’s first public statement with a softer stance on indigenisation. Through this statement, Zhuwao and Chinamasa reconciled their views on indigenisation.
Despite burying the hatchet, Zhuwao and Chinamasa clashed again in April 2016. Zhuwao threatened to close foreign owned banks such as Barclays, Stanbic, Old Mutual, Cabs, Standard Chartered Bank, Ecobank, BancABC and MBCA Bank for failing to submit their indigenisation plans by the 31 March 2016 deadline. Contrary to Zhuwao, Chinamasa stated foreign-owned financial institutions immensely contributed to corporate social responsibility and would not be closed. The unending dispute between Zhuwao and Chinamasa on the indigenisation policy prompted Mugabe to intervene. On 11 April 2016 Mugabe issued a press statement which was circulated to media houses. In a rare admission, Mugabe revealed that there was a conflicting interpretation of the indigenisation policy which was causing confusion and anxiety in the business community and leading to low foreign investment. Mugabe reiterated that the government only insisted on 51% shareholding for indigenous people for companies involved in the extraction of natural resources. He outlined that all other companies were not required to immediately meet the 51% indigenisation threshold. However, he encouraged them to increase their indigenisation credits through promoting ‘socio-economic transformation’ of the country through transferring skills and technology to indigenous people, and creating business linkages. Mugabe stated that the indigenisation policy in his press statement was different from the one in the Indigenisation Act. In an apparent climb down, Mugabe announced that the Indigenisation Act needed to be amended to synchronise it with the new policy. Mugabe reiterated the need to review the Indigenisation Act in his speech at the official opening of the Fourth Session of the Eighth Parliament of Zimbabwe on 6 October 2016. The extent to which the Indigenisation Act will be reviewed and the impact this will have on the economy and the government’s relations with business associations, indigenous interest groups and opposition political parties is yet to be seen.
ZANU-PF effectively appropriated the indigenisation policy and took measures to implement it during the PG era to win elections and retain power. While local business community and foreign investors lost confidence in the MDC-T’s capacity to protect assets and property rights it must be noted that ‘hard power’ was with ZANU-PF which controlled state security apparatus. While the MDC-T offered alternatives to indigenisation the party failed to impress its long-time political ally, the ZCTU. ZANU-PF’s subtle climb down on indigenisation after retaining power exposed the policy’s limitation as a development strategy. This vindicates former RBZ governor Gono, the MDC parties and business association critical of the policy. Criticism of indigenisation from senior ZANU-PF members, and the public conflicts between ministers heading Finance and Indigenisation ministries reveal poor policy co-ordination within the government. One key lesson from the above discussion is that the crafting of indigenisation policies must be harmonised and synchronised with other factors influencing the macroeconomic environment such as investment. More importantly, the government must adopt a pluralist approach in crafting and implementing empowerment policies by adequately consulting business, labour, civil society and other stakeholders.
Musiwaro Ndakaripa is with the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State in South Africa.
 Literature on indigenisation in Zimbabwe has been burgeoning over the years. This include: Brian Raftopolous and Sam Moyo, ‘The Politics of Indigenisation in Zimbabwe’, (Research Paper, Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1994); Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Fighting for control: The indigenization debate in Zimbabwe’, Southern Africa Report, Vol 11, No 4, July 1996; France Maphosa, ‘The role of kinship in indigenous businesses in Zimbabwe’, (D.Phil Thesis, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Zimbabwe, 1996); Volker Wild, Profit not for Profit’s Sake: History and Business Culture of African Entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe, (Baobab Books, Harare, 1997); F. Maphosa, ‘Towards the sociology of Zimbabwean indigenous entrepreneurship’, Zambezia (1998), XXV (II); Rudo Gaidzanwa, ‘Indigenisation as empowerment? Gender and race in the empowerment discourse in Zimbabwe’ in Angela Cheater (ed.), The Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures (Routledge, London, 1999); Scott D. Taylor, ‘Race, Class, and Neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe’ in Richard Joseph, (ed), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1999); Brian Raftopoulos, ‘The State, NGOs and Democratisation’ in Sam Moyo, John Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos (eds.), NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare, SAPES, 2000); Scott Taylor (2002), ‘The challenge of indigenization, affirmative action, and empowerment in Zimbabwe and South Africa’, in Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (eds.), Black Business and Economic Power, (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002); Brian Raftopoulos and Daniel Compagnon, ‘Indigenization, the State Bourgeoisie and Neo-authoritarian Politics’ in Staffan Darnolf and Liisa Laakso (eds.),Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism, (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2003); Booker Magure, ‘Foreign investment, black economic empowerment and militarised patronage politics in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2012) and Musiwaro Ndakaripa, ‘Zimbabwe’s Power Sharing Government and the Politics of Economic Indigenisation, 2009 to 2013’, (Paper presented at CODESRIA 14TH General Assembly, 8 to 12 June 2015, Dakar, Senegal).
 In this essay the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007 will be written in short as ‘the Indigenisation Act’.
 In this essay the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment will be written in short as ‘the Indigenisation Ministry’. Ministers heading this ministry will be referred to as ‘Indigenisation Minister’.
 In this paperr the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act will be written in short as ‘the Indigenisation Act’. For legal criticism of the regulations see: Derek Matyszak, ‘Everything you ever wanted to know (and then some) about Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and economic empowerment legislation but (quite rightly) were too afraid to ask’, (Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare, 2011); Derek Matyszak, ‘Racketeering by regulation’, (Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare, 2011). A number of scholars concur that ZANU-PF was more dominant in the PG. For more literature on this see: Nic Cheeseman and Blessing-Miles Tendi, ‘Power-sharing in comparative perspective: the dynamics of ‘unity government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 48, No. 2, (2010); Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU PF politics under Zimbabwe’s ‘Power-Sharing’ Government’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, (2012); Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, ‘ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity 2009-12’ in Brian Raftopoulos (ed.), The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement, (Weaver Press, Harare, 2013); JoAnn McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-Sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, (2013); and Thys Hoekman, ‘Testing Ties: Opposition and Power-Sharing Negotiations in Zimbawe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, (2013)
 Government of Zimbabwe, The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007, Part 2 (3).
 ‘Indigenisation Act: Gono speaks out’, The Financial Gazette, 18 to 24 March 2010, p. B3.
 Herbert Moyo, ‘MDC-T agonises over indigenisation policy’, Zimbabwe Independent, 12 April 2013.
 ‘Indigenisation Act: Gono speaks out’, p. B2.
Ibid, p. B2.
Ibid, p. B2.
Ibid, p. B2.
 See for example: ‘PM backs indigenisation policy’, The Herald, 18 September 2009; ‘PM defends indigenisation laws’, The Herald, 12 March 2010; ‘Prioritise women in indigenisation drive: DPM Khupe’, The Herald, 26 March 2010; ‘MDC-T opposes indigenisation law’, Sunday News, 23 May 2010; ‘PM sees indigenisation as empowerment’, The Herald, 28 September 2010; ‘Govt committed to indigenisation: PM’, The Herald, 6 May 2011; ‘Indigenisation not punishing foreigners’, The Herald, 18 June 2011; Masvingo Correspondent, ‘Matutu differs with Tsvangirai on indigenisation’, Chronicle, 18 October 2011; ‘Indigenisation: MDC-T playing to the gallery’, The Sunday Mail, 30 October 2011; and 27/6862, Levi Mukarati, ‘Indigenisation: ZANU-PF hijacking govt programme?’, The Financial Gazette, 4 to 10 November 2010, p. 9.
 Masvingo Correspondent, ‘Matutu differs with Tsvangirai on indigenisation’, Chronicle, 18 October 2011
 Herbert Moyo, ‘Indigenisation: MDC-T gropes for response’, The Standard, 19 April 2013.
 Herald Reporter, ‘Zanu-PF, MDC-T head for policy showdown’, The Herald, 15 October 2011, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 1.
 Movement for Democratic Change, Election Manifesto 2013, p. 10.
 Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai), Agenda for Real Transformation (ART), (May 2013, Harare).
Ibid, p. 4.
Ibid, pp. 4, 10, 11, 12, 14.
 Moyo, ‘MDC-T agonises over indigenisation policy’.
 Business Reporter, ‘Indigenisation beneficiaries to be named’, Newsday, 5 May 2011.
 Munyaradzi Musiiwa, ‘ZCTU backs empowerment drive’, The Sunday Mail, 7 July 2013.
 Paidamoyo Muzulu, ‘ZCTU blasts MDC-T policy document’, Zimbabwe Independent, 24 May 2013.
 Musiiwa, ‘ZCTU backs empowerment drive’.
 ZANU-PF, Taking Back the Economy: Indigenise, Empower, Develop and Create Employment, (Harare, June 2013)
 Owen Gagare, ‘Indigenisation has to be flexible’, Zimbabwe Independent, 23 August 2013.
 Government of Zimbabwe, Invest in Zimbabwe 2013 (August 2013).
 Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET), (Harare, October 2013).
 Bernard Mpofu, ’19 firms defy ZANU-PF empowerment policy’, Newsday, 16 December 2013.
 Ray Ndlovu, ‘Indigenisation: Pie in the sky’, The Financial Gazette, 27 March to 2 April 2014, p. P11.
Ibid, p. P11.
Ibid, p. P11.
 Clemence Manyukwe, ‘Revise indigenisation – Mliswa’, The Financial Gazette, 24 October 2013.
 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), ‘Press Release – ZCTU Hails Hurungwe West Member of Parliament Temba Mliswa’, (25 October 2013).
 Taurai Mangudhla, ‘Revisit Indigenisation Act to save industry – CZI’, Zimbabwe Independent, 4 October 2013.
 Mandla Tshuma, ‘Indigenisation still a barrier’, The Financial Gazette, 1 to 7 May 2014, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 1.
 Brian Chitemba, ‘Indigenisation policy review gathering pace’, The Sunday Mail, 1 June 2014, p. 1.
 Darlington Musarurwa, ‘Indigenisation law and policy glaringly inconsistent’, The Sunday Mail, 1 June 2014, p. 8.
 ‘Chinamasa on indigenisation policy’, The Sunday Mail, 1 June 2014, p. 8.
 Chitemba, ‘Indigenisation policy review gathering pace’, p. 1.
 ‘Unanswered questions on indigenisation’, The Sunday Mail, 1 June 2014, p. 9.
 ‘Chinamasa on indigenisation policy’, p. 8.
 Maggie Mzumara, ‘Indigenisation Act continues to create confusion’, The Financial Gazette, 5 to 11 June 2014, p. P6.
Ibid, p. P6.
Ibid, p. P6.
 Clemence Manyukwe, ‘Huge blow for indigenisation’, The Financial Gazette, 6 to 12 March 2014, p. P3.
Ibid, p. P3.
Ibid, p. P3.
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, The 2016 National Budget Statement, (November 2015, Harare), pp. 107-108.
Ibid, p. 108.
 Fungi Kwaramba, ‘Zhuwao, Chinamasa brawl over indigenisation’, The Daily News, 27 December 2015. For more details on Chinamasa and Zhuwao clashes on indigenisation in late 2016 and early 2016 see: Derek Matyszak, ‘Chaos clarified – Zimbabwe’s ‘new’ indigenisation framework’, (Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare, February 2016) and Derek Matyszak, ‘A tale of two Patricks: Zimbabwe’s indigenisation circus continued’, (Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare, March 2016).
 Kwaramba, ‘Zhuwao, Chinamasa brawl over indigenisation’.
 MacDonald Dzirutwe, ‘Zimbabwe gives foreign firms March deadline for empowerment plans’, Reuters, 24 December 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-companies-idUSKBN0U711Z20151224. Accessed on 1 November 2016.
 Kwaramba, ‘Zhuwao, Chinamasa brawl over indigenisation’.
 Felex Share, ‘New indigenisation framework unveiled’ , The Herald, 5 January 2016.
 Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, (Honourable Patrick Zhuwao), ‘Press briefing on the proposed frameworks, procedures and guidelines for implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33]’, (Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, 4 January 2016), p. 2.
Ibid, pp. 3-4.
Ibid, p. 4.
 Victoria Mtomba, ‘Chinamasa vs Zhuwao’, The Standard, 3 April 2016.
 His Excellency R. G. Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, ‘Presidential statement to clarify the government position on the indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy’, (11 April 2016, Harare), pp. 1-2.
Ibid, p. 3.
Ibid, pp. 4-6.
Ibid, pp. 8-9.
Ibid, p. 9.
 ‘Mugabe full speech at the official opening of Parliament’, The Zimbabwe Mail, 6 October 2016, http://thezimbabwemail.com/press-release-30393-mugabe-full-speech-at-the-official-opening-of-parliament.html. Accessed on 1 November 2016.
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The American Historical Review
Description:The American Historical Review (AHR) is the official publication of the American Historical Association (AHA). The AHA was founded in 1884 and chartered by Congress in 1889 to serve the interests of the entire discipline of history. Aligning with the AHA’s mission, the AHR has been the journal of record for the historical profession in the United States since 1895—the only journal that brings together scholarship from every major field of historical study. The AHR is unparalleled in its efforts to choose articles that are new in content and interpretation and that make a contribution to historical knowledge. The journal also publishes approximately one thousand book reviews per year, surveying and reporting the most important contemporary historical scholarship in the discipline.
Coverage: 1895-2012 (Vol. 1, No. 1 - Vol. 117, No. 5)
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Subjects: History, American Studies, History, Area Studies
Collections: Arts & Sciences I Collection, JSTOR Essential Collection